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Party Activism in the Populist Radical Right: The Case of the UK Independence Party 
 
Abstract 
Recent decades have seen an upsurge of interest in populist radical right (PRR) parties. Yet despite a 
large body of research on PRR voters, there are few studies of the internal life of these parties. In 
particular there is a dearth of research about why people are active in them. This paper uses data 
from a unique large-scale survey of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) members to 
investigate if drivers of voting support for these parties are also important for explaining party 
activism. Analyses show that traditional models of party activism are important for understanding 
engagement in UKIP, but macro-level forces captured in an expanded relative deprivation model 
also stimulate participation in the party. That said macro-level forces are not the dominant driver of 
activism.  
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Party Activism in the Populist Radical Right: The Case of the UK Independence Party 
 Since Klaus von Beyme’s (1988) influential edited volume on right-wing extremism, the past 
three decades have witnessed an explosion of research on populist radical right (PRR) parties. 
Unsurprisingly, following the rise of parties like the Front National in France, the ‘Freedom Parties’ 
in Austria and the Netherlands, the Danish People’s Party in Denmark and the League in Italy, the 
PRR has become the most studied party family in the Western world.  
The resulting literature has mainly focused on four research questions: who votes for PRR 
parties (e.g. Lubbers and Coenders 2017);  how to explain the considerable cross-national variation 
in levels of support (e.g. Golder 2003; Norris 2005);  the policy and government effects of PRR 
parties (e.g. Akkerman 2012; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; Careja et al. 2016; Minkenberg 
2001);  and the impact of PRR parties on inter-party competition (Akkerman, de Lange & Rooduijn 
2016; Bale et al. 2010; Wagner and Meyer 2017).  
The rising tide of electoral support for PRR parties in European democracies shows that 
electorates have changed their attitudes to these parties in recent years.  They have become 
‘respectable’ in a way which was not true in the past. This raises the question about the extent to 
which factors which motivate people to vote for PRR parties also encourage them to join and be 
active in these parties.  We know that distrust of existing political and economic elites, feelings of 
being left behind by economic neglect, changing social values, and perceived threats to cultural 
identities are powerful drivers of electoral support for these parties (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014, 
Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Rydgren 2018; Spierings and Zaslove 2017).  But to what extent are 
these factors also important drivers of party membership and activism?   
Though the literature on PRR parties has grown rapidly, there are significant omissions in 
the research particularly in relation to understanding their internal organization, membership and 
rates of activism. Noteworthy exceptions to this include regional studies of party sympathizers 
(Ivaldi 1996), small-scale surveys of mid-level party elites (Ignazi and Colette 1992), studies of the 
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contextual predictors of membership (Biggs and Knauss 2012;
 
Goodwin, Ford and Cutts 2013), and 
qualitative and ethnographic studies of activists (e.g. Blee 2007; Busher 2015; Goodwin 2011; 
Klandermans and Mayer 2005). But such work has left important questions unanswered, such as who 
becomes active in these parties and why?  
The lack of attention to this question is significant given that activists help to drive the 
parties forward. They are as important to populist radical right parties as they are to more traditional 
parties, since they play key roles in organising, campaigning for, and funding these parties as well as 
acting more generally as ‘ambassadors in the community’ (Scarrow, 1996). These activities help to 
reduce the stigma associated with these parties in the wider electorate (e.g. Art 2011; Dinas et al. 
2016; Ellinas and Lamprianou 2017).  
The lack of research on active recruits also contrasts sharply with a general renaissance of 
scholarly interest in mainstream party activism which has taken place in recent years (e.g. Bale et al. 
2019; Van Biezen et al. 2012; Webb and Bale 2014; Whiteley 2011). PRR parties are also interesting 
because they appear to have reversed a long established trend of declining party membership and 
activism in many contemporary democratic countries (Whiteley, 2011, Van Biezen et al. 2012). The 
evidence suggests that membership and activism has been growing in parties such as the National 
Front in France, the Freedom Party in Austria, the League in Italy and in our case study UKIP in the 
United Kingdom1. In short, despite calls for more work on their internal organization (Goodwin 
2006), we still know very little about populist radical right parties’ most committed supporters. 
The resurgence of membership and activism in PRR parties raises an important question 
regarding whether well-established explanatory models of intra-party participation apply to them, or 
if there is a need to modify these models (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002; Scarrow 2015; Gauja, 2015).  In 
this paper, we address this question by drawing on a unique large-scale membership survey of a PRR 
                                                 
1
 In 1990 the National Front in France had 50,000 members and by 2006 it had 75,000. The Freedom party in Austria had 
42,413 members in 1990 and by 2014 it had 50,000. The Lega Nord (renamed the ‘League’) in Italy had 112,400 
members in 1992 and 182,502 in 2010. See the Members and Activists in Political Parties (MAPP) database on party 
membership https://www.projectmapp 
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party, which includes multiple measures of activism and allows us to better explore and understand 
the determinants of involvement in these parties. We focus on the UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
which emerged as a successful PRR party in Western Europe after 2010 and played a key role in 
mobilizing the 2016 vote for Brexit in the EU referendum in Britain (Clarke et al. 2017; Heath and 
Goodwin 2016). To our knowledge, this is the first PRR membership survey of its kind.  
Importantly, the survey was conducted when the party was at its peak, providing a 
comprehensive dataset to test competing theories of differential activism within a populist radical 
right party. Compared to other surveys on party members, we have a sufficient number of 
respondents with varying levels and types of involvement to investigate the different theories in 
question. This allows us to test the extent to which traditional explanations of party activism apply to 
the populist radical right while at the same time examining if there are unique drivers of activism in 
this party family. 
In brief, analyses show that people who are active in the populist radical right are 
motivated by many of the same factors which explain activism in more traditional parties across the 
political spectrum. In this respect existing theories of party activism apply to UKIP much as they do 
to mainstream parties. That said, there are also distinctive factors which stimulate intra-party 
involvement in UKIP associated with the relative deprivation theory and which help to drive 
electoral support for the party. To the extent that UKIP is a representative case, the inference is that 
PRR parties differ from their mainstream rivals, but only to a limited extent.  
Explaining Party Activism 
Joining and becoming active in a political party is one form of political participation.  Thus models 
which explain why people become actively engaged in politics are all potentially relevant for 
explaining differential types and levels of intra-party activity. Some of these relate to long-term 
social processes involving social class, family socialisation and community cohesion. The civic 
voluntarism and social capital models are examples since they both stress the importance of 
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individual and community resources as major drivers of political participation (Verba et al., 1995; 
Pattie et al. 2004). In the civic voluntarism model individual resources such as income, social status 
and education are important, whereas in the social capital model community resources such as 
voluntary activity and interpersonal trust are prominent (Putnam, 2000).  
Populist radical right parties, however, often emerge as major players over relatively short 
time intervals. Although ideologically distinct parties like the Sweden Democrats and UK 
Independence Party have fairly lengthy histories, they have enjoyed quickly paced breakthroughs, 
suggesting that the accompanying rise in party membership and activism cannot be adequately 
explained by slow-moving social processes. For this reason, we focus on three theoretical models 
that have been developed to explain differential party activism and which are not subject to this 
criticism.  
The first is the general incentives model, originally developed at the time of the first surveys 
of party members in Britain (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson, 1994; 
Whiteley, Seyd and Billinghurst, 2006). The model is based on the idea that there are incentives 
which motivate individuals to join and become active in a party organization. Perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of political action are at the centre of the theory, but it focuses on a wider range of 
incentives than narrowly defined cost/benefit calculations. The model also includes social-
psychological variables relating to social norms and ideological beliefs which help to motivate 
individuals to get involved. It distinguishes between collective and selective benefits, where the 
former are ‘public goods’ which motivate members seeking to promote policies that apply to society 
as a whole, whereas the latter are ‘private goods’ such as individual political ambitions which are 
only relevant to those who get involved.2  Since its inception the general incentives model has been 
                                                 
2
 The predictors of membership and activism in parties in the general incentives model are: (1) The perception of the 
probability that their participation in a party will achieve a desired collective outcome; (2) The respondent’s desired 
collective outcomes, such as changes in policies if their party wins an election; (3) The assessment of the selective 
outcome benefits of activism; that is, material or career benefits; (4) assessment of the selective process benefits of 
activism or the intrinsic rewards associated with involvement in political action; (5) altruistic motivations for activism; 
(6) perception of social norms relating to activism, or a desire to conform to the expectations of significant others; (7) 
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employed to explain party membership and intra-organizational activism in various parties and 
countries (Gallagher & Marsh 2002; Spier & Klein 2015; Ridder et al 2015; Van Haute and Gauja, 
2015; Poletti, Webb and Bale, 2018). 
Also of interest is the mobilization model which focuses on social networks as mechanisms 
for recruiting individuals into politics. Simply put, some people become actively engaged because 
the opportunities for them to do so are greater than for others and because they are persuaded to get 
involved by ‘significant others’ in their families and social networks (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; 
Whiteley and Seyd, 2002). Mobilization can be driven by social dynamics and social connections 
with peers and these have been shown to be important drivers of political action (e.g. Kahne and 
Bowyer 2018; Sinclair 2012; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Webb et al. 2019). Furthermore, active 
involvement in politics can be ‘socially contagious’, so that individuals with connections to an 
activist become more likely to be active themselves (Bond et al. 2012; Doherty and Schraeder 2018). 
For example, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2012) document that an individual's participation is influenced 
by whether other people in his/her household participate in politics. 
Although these two models have their differences, they are generally united in contesting the 
idea that party activism is solely a response to ‘top-down’ elite-level mobilization. This is an 
important point given that much of the research on the radical right points to the importance of 
‘charismatic’ leaders in winning support (e.g. Bos et al. 2011; De Lange and Art 2011; Eatwell 2018) 
or, increasingly, the role of mass media (Berning et al. 2018; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; 
Murphy and Devine 2018; Sheets et al. 2015). These studies suggest that ‘macro-mobilization’ could 
be important for recruiting party members and activists in PRR parties, alongside the more micro-
level factors discussed earlier. A similar point can be made about relative deprivation theory which is 
the third of the models of political participation we examine.  This model is distinctive since it 
                                                                                                                                                                    
expressive or emotional motivations for activism, such as the strength of an attachment to a party or leader; (8) 
perception of the costs of activism (see Seyd and Whiteley, 1992). 
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contains variables which are similar to those discussed in the literature on voting for PRR parties, 
and so we examine it next 
Relative Deprivation and Party Activism in PRR Parties 
Relative deprivation theory was originally introduced by Stouffer et al. (1949) and developed further 
by Runciman (1966). The theory is based on the proposition that individuals develop expectations 
about how economic, political and social systems should treat them, and at the same time judgements 
about how they are actually treated in practice. The more negative the comparison between what 
people expect and what they receive, the more likely they are to experience frustration and anger 
(Walker and Smith, 2002). These emotional responses are a ‘potent, volatile, instigator of action’ 
(Marcus et al., 2000: 26) and a stimulus to political involvement which can include becoming active 
in a party (Conover and Feldman, 1986; Marcus, 1988). 
 
This raises an interesting question about whether there is a version of the relative deprivation 
model of political participation which applies to PRR parties and which takes into account the notion 
of ‘macro-mobilization’ arising from forces in society as a whole.  If so, this could be quite 
important for recruiting members to PRR parties and also for explaining why they are growing in 
comparison with many mainstream parties. This idea reflects an important theme in the literature on 
support for radical right parties, namely that large numbers of individuals perceive of having been 
‘left behind’ by macro-level developments in contemporary society and the economy. 
 
Changes in contemporary capitalism engendered by globalisation, international migration and 
stagnating wages, particularly among low skilled workers, have created a situation in which large 
sections of the electorate have failed to share in the fruits of economic growth. Trade imbalances 
between western countries and Asia, particularly China, accompanied by the outsourcing of skilled 
manufacturing jobs and the movement of industries to low cost countries are important causes of 
growing inequality (Galbraith, 2012; Atkinson, 2015). These economic trends, coupled with the 
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trauma of the Great Recession have created serious political problems for the mainstream parties 
across the democratic world (Stiglitz, 2002).  
These developments give rise to a syndrome of grievances based on the economic 
marginalisation of individuals, perceived threats from immigrants, refugees and ethnic- minority 
groups, and identity politics (Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007; Oesch, 2008; Posner, 2010; Reich, 2016; 
Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, 2017). At the same time those 
encountering these adverse circumstances tend to share authoritarian or socially conservative values, 
which are often associated with low levels of formal education (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Oesch 
2008; Rydgren 2012). So threat perceptions arising from adverse economic and cultural 
developments are reinforced by rapid changes in society which challenge traditional values (Stenner, 
2004). 
Gest et al. (2017), for example, argue that support for PRR movements in the US and UK is 
rooted in anxiety about the perceived discrepancy between current status of individuals and their past 
status. Similarly, Gidron and Hall (2017) contend that the appeal of populist radical right parties is 
especially strong among those with lower levels of subjective social status, and an accompanying 
belief that they are not being accorded the appropriate level of respect or esteem within the social 
order. From this perspective, becoming a PRR activist is part of a quest to regain social status that is 
perceived to have been lost by developments in the economy and society. 
These different ideas fit within a relative deprivation model of activism, but it is essentially a 
micro-theory about individuals reacting to circumstances in their own lives (Runciman, 1966).  In 
contrast, the ‘left behind’ thesis has its origins in broader macro-level developments in economy and 
society which have mobilised some people into political action. These dynamics are important since 
as the earlier discussion indicated most research on political participation focuses on the positive 
impact of individual resources on involvement, for example, in the civic voluntarism model (Verba, 
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Schlozman and Brady, 1995).  In the case of relative deprivation theory, however, individual 
perceptions of a lack of resources are the motivational force. 
If macro-level forces are important drivers of activism within populist right parties, a 
modified relative deprivation model of activism which takes these into account could have important 
explanatory power. In the next section we describe the research design and operationalization of 
variables used to test the general incentives, mobilization and the modified relative deprivation 
model of party activism.  
Research Design and Data 
A key challenge to the study of the populist right is to gather a sufficient number of observations to 
be able to examine systematic differences within the parties. UKIP is a desirable case for study 
because, at its peak, the party had a large number of members with varying levels and types of 
activity3. Accordingly, we conducted a full membership survey between December 2014 and January 
2015, providing a unique opportunity to test the various models described above for one of the most 
successful PRR parties in Western Europe (Ford and Goodwin; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2016).4 
Although it was founded in 1993, UKIP did not have major electoral successes until the 
2010-2015 Parliament when it shifted away from its origins as a single-issue movement opposed to 
Britain’s membership of the European Union (EU) and added opposition to immigration and anti-
establishment populism to its programme. UKIP won the 2014 European Parliament elections 
outright with 26.6 per cent of the vote, polled nearly 13 per cent of the national vote at the 2015 
general election and then campaigned vigorously for Brexit during the 2016 referendum on Britain’s 
EU membership (Clarke et al. 2017; Goodwin and Heath 2016). Support for the party subsequently 
collapsed in the 2017 general election as many former UKIP voters switched to the Conservative 
Party whose leader, Theresa May, had set out the case for a ‘hard Brexit’ in her Lancaster House 
speech in January 2017 (Whiteley et al. 2018).  
                                                 
3
 Details of the requirements for joining the party can be found on: https://join.ukip.org/joinonline.aspx?type=1/ 
4
 A legal agreement with the party prevented the researchers from releasing analyses of the data until 2017. 
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Our UKIP membership survey was conducted during the peak period of the party’s electoral 
success. After negotiating with the national leadership of the party which agreed to allow the 
researchers access to the membership database to conduct an online survey, the aim was to achieve a 
census of the membership rather than a sample5. In the event, the achieved sample size was very 
large (N=14,683) in comparison with earlier surveys of party members. Our interest in this paper is 
delineating and explaining levels and types of party activism and thus the survey of UKIP members 
asked a wide variety of questions (see Online Appendix).  
To give a flavour of the items used to measure party activism, one question simply asked: 
'Overall, how active are you in UKIP?' with respondents given four options: 'not at all active', 'not 
very active', 'fairly active', and 'very active'. Figure 1 shows that most of the respondents reported 
being active only to a limited extent.  That said, slightly over one-sixth considered themselves to be 
‘fairly active’ and another slightly smaller group said that they were ‘very active’.    
(Figure 1 about here) 
In addition to the activism question, we employed several different measures of involvement. 
These were: hours spent on party work every week; hours spent on party work during the European 
Parliament election of 2014; participation in party conferences; seeking office as a UKIP candidate; 
displaying election posters; signing petitions supported by the party; donating money to the party; 
distributing election materials; participating in party meetings; helping out at party functions; and 
canvassing on behalf of the party and its candidates (see the Online Appendix). Although these 
measures are correlated with one another, there is a great degree of heterogeneity in the strength of 
the relationships. For example, the correlation (r) between helping at a UKIP party function and 
attended a UKIP meeting is 0.66, whereas the correlation between donating money to UKIP and 
signing a petition supported by the party is considerably weaker at 0.27. 
                                                 
5
 An additional survey of the relatively small number of members who did not have access to the internet was also 
conducted by mail for validation purposes. No significant differences existed between the online and mail survey 
respondents. 
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The analysis of the structure of intra-party activism proceeded by using an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) of the various activism variables to identify if there are distinctive latent variables 
underlying the measures and which of them were most strongly associated with the factors. These 
EFA results provided guidance for specifying a confirmatory factor analysis model (CFA) of the 
structure of various activities in UKIP (Acock, 2013).  This CFA model has the advantage of 
estimating correlations between factors, unlike the exploratory analysis, allowing us to identify how 
closely related they are in practice. The relationships in the CFA model are shown in the path 
diagram in Figure 2. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Figure 2 indicates that there are three latent variables that structure the party activity 
variables6. These three factors relate to supporting the party without becoming very involved, being 
engaged in various 'face-to-face' activities for the party, and thirdly being intensely involved. Thus, 
the ‘Support’ factor identifies things like donating money and displaying election posters. The 
‘Activism’ factor includes items like attending party meetings and conferences, canvassing at 
election times and spending time working for the party in inter-election periods. Finally the ‘Intense 
Activism’ factor refers to the work of a relatively small number of members who are very heavily 
involved on a continuous basis as candidates for local and national office and also as sitting local 
councillors. The latter work harder than ordinary members and activists, and so constitute the elite of 
the party membership. The CFA reveals strong correlations between the three latent variables 
suggesting that for purposes of analysis they can be combined into a single overarching activism 
scale7. Figure 3 shows the distribution of UKIP members' scores on the overall activism scale. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
For the variables which operationalise the relative deprivation, mobilisation and general 
incentive models, we rely on standard questions used in previous studies (see Online Appendix). 
                                                 
6
 The observed variables are in boxes and the latent variables in ovals, the former including error terms (not shown) 
7
 The correlation (r) between Support and Activism is .88, between Support and High Intensity Activism .86 and between 
Activism and High Intensity Activism is .82. 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the demographics and activism scales in the analysis8.  It 
shows that UKIP members are predominantly male, middle-aged and have relatively modest incomes 
and comparatively low levels of education.  Similar findings have emerged from earlier studies of the 
UKIP membership and also from studies of voting support for the party (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; 
Clarke et al. 2017). 
(Table 1 about here) 
Analysing Intra-Party Participation 
We begin by studying relationships between explanatory variables in the three participation 
models and the combined activism scale.  We sketch out the key variables in each of the models 
here, but more detailed definitions can be found in the online appendix. These analyses help us to 
understand which model provides the best account of broadly defined activism in UKIP.  
To consider the micro-level indicators in the relative deprivation model first, they are based 
on two Likert indicators combined into a single scale: ‘There is often a big gap between what people 
like yourself expect out of life and what you actually get’ and ‘The Government generally treats 
people like yourself fairly’.  In addition another micro-level variable invites respondents to compare 
their own economic circumstances with those of the country as a whole. In this case if respondents 
feel that the country is doing well while they are doing badly, this captures perceptions of being ‘left 
behind’ in the face of increasing national prosperity.   
Following the earlier discussion, we revise this micro-level relative deprivation model by 
adding a number of macro-level variables which relate to respondent attitudes to developments in the 
economy and society.  Firstly, we include dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in Britain and 
also a measure of anti-elitist sentiments.  The latter is measured with a battery of items including 
‘Economic inequality is a major problem in Britain’ and ‘Corporate greed is a major problem in 
Britain’.  Secondly, there are three policy related items which may give rise to perceptions of 
                                                 
8
 Note that descriptive statistics for all variables appear in the appendix 
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deprivation.  These relate to the state of the economy, dissatisfaction with immigration and of course 
dissatisfaction with the key issue of UK membership of the European Union.   
 The mobilization model includes a variable which measures the respondent’s attention to 
politics, thereby capturing the idea of cognitive mobilisation. It also includes measures of the role of 
social networks in recruiting and retaining party members over time.  The first of these is based on a 
question asking if they were recruited into the party via ‘significant others’ in their social networks 
as opposed to joining on their own initiative.  The second captures the extent to which they see 
politics as a means of developing social contacts with like-minded people.  This is captured by 
indicators such as ‘Being an active party member is a good way to meet interesting people’ and 
‘Getting involved in party activities can be fun’.  The mobilisation model also includes a question 
about whether respondents were party members in the past, and also about their parent’s involvement 
in political parties when they were growing up. The latter is designed to identify any socialisation 
effects arising from their family background which might induce them to join a party such as UKIP.  
The general incentives model focuses on perceptions of the costs and benefits of party 
membership and also includes measures of selective benefits such as the respondent’s political 
ambitions. It separates out collective benefits from private benefits, by asking respondents to 
compare their affective feelings for UKIP in comparison with Labour, the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats.  The idea here is to capture the extent to which they are attached to the party as 
an organisation which can bring them policy success and benefits in comparison with its rivals. Other 
indicators include the role of social norms, perceptions of a sense of civic duty, and left-right 
ideology as mechanisms for stimulating activism in the party. The general incentives model also 
shares with the mobilisation model an indicator of the influence of other people in promoting people 
to join and be active in the party.      
Table 2 about here 
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Table 2 contains the estimates of overall party activism scale using the different models in the 
analysis.  The general incentives model is clearly the most successful in terms of goodness of fit with 
an R2 statistic of 0.28 and also the smallest (best) AIC value9. All predictors in the model with the 
exception of the respondent’s attitudes to immigration are statistically significant.  Efficacy-
discounted collective benefits have a positive impact on activism, while perceptions of the costs of 
activism have a negative impact.  Equally, political ambitions, social norms relating to participation, 
social networks and perceptions that the respondent has a duty to get involved in politics all have 
positive impacts on activism. Similarly, individuals are more likely to be active the further to the 
right they are on the left-right ideological scale.  However, the quadratic specification of this variable 
shows that the effect weakens as they move further to the right.  Finally, education has a positive 
effect on activism, and income has a negative effect. 
While the general incentives model is the most successful, it is clear that the relative 
deprivation and mobilisation models contribute to explaining overall activism as well.  In the micro-
relative deprivation model, indicators of the respondent feeling left behind by national prosperity and 
also the relative deprivation scale have statistically significant impacts on activism.  These sources of 
individual feelings of deprivation act as stimuli to activism.  Similarly, in common with the general 
incentives model, education has a positive impact on activism and income a negative impact.  This 
finding itself can be a source of relative deprivation if individuals perceive a gap between their 
educational backgrounds and their incomes.  
The revised relative deprivation model adds macro-level policy variables relating to the 
economy, immigration and UK membership of the European Union.  It is clear that these national 
policy variables have an important impact on activism.  Individuals who are optimistic about the 
state of the national economy are less likely to be active, so grievances over the national economy 
help to drive participation.  In addition dissatisfaction with UK membership of the European Union 
                                                 
9
 The general incentives model has many more variables than the other models and for this reason might be expected to 
be a better fit.  The Aikaike Information Criteria (AIC) penalises models with larger numbers of variables and so 
provides a better measure of fit than the R2 statistic 
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and also with immigration into Britain serves to stimulate activism.  On the other hand anti-elitist 
attitudes and dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in Britain have no effects.  These findings 
suggest that concrete policy grievances at the macro-level drive activism, but rather more abstract 
ideas about the state of democracy and elite behaviour do not.  
Turning next to the mobilisation model, this shows that members who pay more attention to 
politics were more likely to be active, which is not surprising.  In addition, individuals who were 
persuaded joined the party by ‘significant others’ and were attracted by the desire to meet like-
minded people were also more active. It is clear from these results that social networks mobilise 
individuals to be active. There is also evidence of family socialisation effects as well, since they were 
more likely to be active if their parents were involved in party politics when they were growing up.  
The same point can be made about respondents who had previously been a party member in the past 
which boosted their rates of activism in the party.  
One of the most important factors in the mobilisation model is attitudes to Nigel Farage, the 
party leader at the time.  This variable compares his popularity among members with that of the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders. It shows that individuals who liked him a lot 
and at the same time disliked other leaders a lot were more likely to be active.  Moreover the 
quadratic specification shows that as this gap grows wider the bigger the effect on activism.  This 
variable captures how anti-elite sentiments arising from a distrust of conventional political leaders 
and attraction to their own leader have a direct effect on participation in UKIP. 
Table 2 looks at the overall relationship between the different models and activism, but as the 
earlier discussion indicates we identified three different types of activism in the data.  Accordingly, 
in the next section we examine how these models of participation combine to influence the different 
types of participation. 
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Modelling the Determinants of Types of Activism 
The three types of participation in UKIP identified in Figure 2 were described as ‘Political 
Support’, ‘Political Activism’ and ‘High Intensity Activism’, each one describing successively 
higher levels of involvement in the grassroots party organisation. To shed further light on 
relationships we estimate the effects of a combination of all three models of activism on each of the 
activism scales. The results of this analysis appear in Table 3.  
(Table 3 about here) 
The first column in Table 3 contains the composite model estimates of the overall activism 
scale utilised in Table 2. It is clear that the goodness of fit (0.31) is higher than in the individual 
models in Table 2 and the AIC has improved, indicating that all three models make an independent 
contribution to explaining activism.  Interestingly enough looking at the demographics in the 
composite model the educational effects have disappeared whereas age, income and to a lesser extent 
gender continue to have important effects on activism. This shows that in the most comprehensive 
specification of the activism model elderly white males on relative modest incomes are more likely 
to be active than members in general.   
In the relative deprivation section of the composite model, perceptions of being left behind, 
economic evaluations and dissatisfaction with the European Union continue to be significant 
predictors of activism. However, anti-elitist attitudes have a negative impact on activism, which 
reinforces the earlier point that rather abstract ideas relating to corporate greed, inequality and the 
state of democracy in Britain do not appear to motivate UKIP members to be more active, even 
though many of them agree with the statements on which the scales were built.   
As far as the mobilisation model is concerned all of the variables continue to be strong 
predictors in the composite model, except for evaluations of Nigel Farage which still has an effect, 
but it is linear rather than a quadratic.  Thus the UKIP leader plays an important role in mobilising 
members to be active, alongside their connections to social networks and their past experience of 
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party membership.  The effect of parental involvement in party politics is no longer significant 
indicating that its effects are explained by other variables.  
The general incentives section of the composite model is very similar to the individual 
version in Table 2.  Thus activism is motivated by collective benefits and inhibited by perceptions of 
costs.  A sense of civic duty, ambitions to be involved in politics, social norms and motivations 
arising from the process of politics itself all continue to have important effects.  Finally party 
members to the right of the political spectrum are more likely to be active than others, but the effects 
weaken as they move further to the right.   
The remaining columns in Table 3 contain estimates of the political support, political 
activism and high-intensity activism scales and they are all very similar to the overall activism 
model.  In every model age, income and gender are significant predictors of activism and support, 
but not education.  In relation to the relative deprivation model, perceptions of being left behind 
continue to be significant predictors, although the coefficients suggest they are more important for 
activists than for supporters.  The micro-relative deprivation scale has changed signs and has a 
negative impact on supporters and activists but does not appear to influence high intensity activists.  
This suggests that when controls for other variables are in place these rather abstract items have a 
tendency to demobilise some respondents.  A similar point can be made about the anti-elite scale.  
The macro-policy variables are important in all three models but they tend to be stronger for activists 
than for supporters.  
In the mobilisation model the effects tend to be stronger in the case of activists and high 
intensity activists than for supporters.  This is true for the recruitment of members through their 
social networks, and also in relation to incentives to build a network of like-minded individuals after 
joining the party.  In this regard past party membership remains a strong predictor in all three 
models, though not parental party activism. Nigel Farage continued to have an important effect on 
participation, but the UKIP leader had a bigger impact on supporters than he did on activists. This 
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suggests that he was more important for recruiting new members than for encouraging existing 
members to become more active.     
The general incentives model plays an important role in explaining participation in all three 
models.  Not surprisingly, political ambition is more important for the activists than supporters, 
although some of the latter harbour political ambitions as well.  In addition, while all are aware of the 
costs of participation they have a bigger deterrent effect among activists than for supporters.  Finally 
all three types of participant are influenced by a sense of civic duty, social norms regarding 
participation and the left-right ideology scale.  As regards the latter, the effects of ideology are 
stronger for the activists and high-intensity activists than for the supporters.  Finally, as we observed 
in connection with the mobilisation model the effects of social networks are all positive, but activists 
are more likely to be motivated by them than supporters, which is not surprising given that they 
interact much more closely with each other.   
Conclusions 
Findings from a survey of UKIP's membership conducted in late 2014 and early 2015 suggest 
that members of populist radical right parties, which are prominent in many EU member states, may 
have a lot in common with mainstream party members when it comes to understanding what 
motivates intra-party involvement. In UKIP's case, many of the factors used to explain mainstream 
activism—such as cognitive mobilisation and various incentives for involvement—are at work, 
bringing people in to join this populist radical right party and subsequently encouraging some of 
them to be active. 
 The findings confirm the validity of existing models of activism that have been tested on 
different party families in different countries in previous research, and the results do not suggest that 
PRR parties are fundamentally different from these others. Second, when we use the data to take 
  
 
19
context into account with additional control variables (e.g. when people decided to become a 
member of UKIP10) we find substantially identical results suggesting the findings are robust.  
The present analyses point to the need for a more nuanced understanding of recruitment and 
activism in radical right parties.  Elite mobilisation is an important factor in explaining participation 
in the grassroots but it is far from being the whole story. Although variables tapping such influences 
on participation did account for some variation in the models, they were not as crucial as we might 
expect if the party members were simply motivated by a top-down mobilisation process driven by 
charismatic leaders.  
This unique survey of UKIP members throws considerable light on the predictive power of 
alternative models of activism within the populist right. However, this advantage comes at the cost of 
generalizability and raises the question about the extent to which present findings apply to other 
populist parties in other countries. While future research will benefit from conducting similar large-
scale surveys for such parties, we believe that results documented here will show a robust general 
pattern for the determinants of party activism within the populist right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 See Online Appendix. 
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Figure 1. Self-Reported Levels of Activity in UKIP 
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Figure 2. Path Diagram of Relationships Between Measured Activism Variables and  
Three Latent Activism Factors 
 
 
Note: observed activism variables are in rectangles and latent activism factors are in circles. Curved 
lines with double-headed arrows indicate error variances for observed activism variables; straight 
lines from latent factors to observed variables indicate factor loadings; curved lines between latent 
factors indicate inter-factor correlations. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Scores on Overall UKIP Activism Scale 
 
Note: overall activism scale scores are calculated as sum of scores on three party  activism factors. 
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Table 1 Selected Descriptive Statistics in the Modelling 
      
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max 
Activism Scale 12,114 -0.00 1.81 -1.93 -1.42 -0.70 1.06 5.34 
Political Support 12,114 -0.00 0.43 -0.65 -0.36 -0.09 0.28 1.08 
Political Activism 12,114 -0.00 0.70 -0.69 -0.60 -0.27 0.53 1.47 
High Intensity 
Activism 12,114 0.00 0.77 -0.59 -0.55 -0.34 0.29 2.79 
Male 12,114 0.84 0.37 0 1 1 1 1 
Age 12,114 4.88 1.33 1 4 5 6 6 
Income 12,114 3.14 1.78 1 2 3 4 8 
Education 12,114 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
 
     
Note: See online appendix for details of codings.      
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Table 2 Rival Models of the Overall Activism Rates of UKIP Party Members 
 
Micro Relative 
Deprivation 
Revised 
Relative 
Deprivation 
Mobilization General Incentives 
Age 0.02 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.25*** (0.01) 
Male -0.04 (0.04) 0.002 (0.04) 0.10** (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) 
Education 0.13*** (0.03) 0.13*** (0.03) 0.15*** (0.03) 0.13*** (0.03) 
Income -0.08*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) 
Left Behind 0.10*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Micro Relative Deprivation 0.06*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction 0.01 (0.02) 
Anti-Elitist Perceptions 0.0002 (0.02) 
Economic Evaluations -0.16*** (0.02) 
Dissatisfaction with the EU 0.41*** (0.04) 
Dissatisfaction with 
Immigration  0.06
***
 (0.02) 
 
 
Social Network Recruitment 0.95*** (0.06) 
Attention to Politics 0.19*** (0.01) 
Parents Politically Active 0.06*** (0.02) 
Party Member in Past 0.30*** (0.03) 
Evaluations of Farage 0.05*** (0.01) 
Evaluations of Farage 
Squared   0.01
***
 (0.001) 
 
Weighted Collective Benefits 
 
  
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
Perception of Costs -0.20*** (0.01) 
Civic Duty 0.06*** (0.01) 
Political Ambitions 0.62*** (0.02) 
Social Norms 0.06*** (0.02) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.15*** (0.04) 
Ideology Squared -0.02*** (0.003) 
Social Network Motivations 0.39*** (0.02) 0.37*** (0.02) 
Constant -0.31** (0.12) -1.53*** (0.20) -1.89*** (0.13) -1.84*** (0.16) 
AIC 48505.22 48304.47 47189.53 44763.09 
Observations 12,114 12,114 12,114 12,114 
R2 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.28 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Smaller values of the AIC 
indicate a better model performance. * p<0.10 **p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3 Composite Models of the Dimensions of UKIP Party Activism 
 
Overall 
Activism 
Political 
Support 
Political 
Activism 
High Intensity 
Activism 
Age 0.22*** (0.01)   0.06*** (0.003)   0.09*** (0.005) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Male 0.07* (0.04) 0.02** (0.01)   0.01 (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 
Education 0.09*** (0.03)   0.001 (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 
Income -0.07*** (0.01)  -0.01*** (0.002) -0.03*** (0.003)  -0.03*** (0.004) 
Left Behind 0.04*** (0.01)   0.01*** (0.002)  0.01*** (0.003)   0.02*** (0.003) 
Micro Relative Deprivation -0.05*** (0.01)  -0.01*** (0.002) -0.02*** (0.004)  -0.02*** (0.004) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction  0.02 (0.02) 0.001 (0.004)  0.01* (0.01)      0.01 (0.01) 
Anti-Elitist Perceptions -0.10*** (0.02)  -0.02*** (0.004) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) 
Economic Evaluations -0.12*** (0.02)  -0.03*** (0.004) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) 
Dissatisfaction with the EU 0.32*** (0.03) 0.09*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 
Dissatisfaction with 
Immigration  0.01 (0.02) 0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.01)      0.01 (0.01) 
Social Network Recruitment 0.85*** (0.05) 0.19*** (0.01) 0.36*** (0.02) 0.30*** (0.02) 
Attention to Politics 0.05*** (0.01)   0.01*** (0.002)   0.02*** (0.004)   0.02*** (0.004) 
Parents Politically Active  0.03 (0.02)  0.01** (0.004) 0.004 (0.01)      0.01* (0.01) 
Party Member in Past 0.17*** (0.03) 0.04*** (0.01)  0.07*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Evaluations of Farage  0.02* (0.01) 0.003 (0.003)   0.01* (0.01)      0.01** (0.01) 
Evaluations of Farage 
Squared 0.002
*
 (0.001) 0.001
***
 
(0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0004) 0.001 (0.0005) 
Weighted Collective 
Benefits 
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0000) 
0.001*** 
(0.0000)    0.001
***
 (0.0000) 
Perception of Costs -0.19*** (0.01)  -0.03*** (0.004)  -0.09*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) 
Civic Duty 0.06*** (0.01)   0.03*** (0.004)  0.01*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 
Political Ambitions 0.60*** (0.02)   0.11*** (0.004)  0.23*** (0.01) 0.25*** (0.01) 
Social Norms 0.05*** (0.02)   0.02*** (0.004)   0.01* (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.16*** (0.04) 0.03*** (0.01)  0.07*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 
Ideology Squared -0.02
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) -0.01
***
 (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) 
Social Network Motivations 0.37*** (0.02)   0.08*** (0.004) 0.14*** (0.01) 0.15*** (0.01) 
Constant -3.06*** (0.23) -0.84*** (0.06) -1.09*** (0.09)    -1.13*** (0.10) 
AIC 44216.65 10321.96 21684.84 23719.89 
Observations 12,114 12,114 12,114 12,114 
R2 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.31 
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A. Question Wording and Construction of Scales 
A.1 Activism Questions 
Concept Question wording Answers 
Contact Local Party Over the last 12 months, 
how often have you had 
contact with people active in 
your local UKIP branch? 
Not At All  
Rarely (once or twice)  
Occasionally (three to five times)  
Frequently (more than five times)  
 
Attend Local Party 
Meeetings 
Over the last 12 months, 
how often have you 
attended a local (e.g., ward 
or constituency) UKIP 
meeting? 
 
Not At All  
Rarely (once or twice)  
Occasionally (three to five times)  
Frequently (more than five times)  
Overall activity 
 
Overall, how active are you 
in UKIP? 
Not at all active  
Not very active  
Fairly active  
Very active 
 
Attend UKIP local 
conference 
Have you ever attended a 
local UKIP party 
conference? 
Have attended a local conference  
Have never attended a local 
conference 
 
Attend UKIP 
national/regional 
Conferences 
Have you ever attended a 
UKIP party conference? 
[Please tick all that apply] 
 
Have attended a national conference  
Have attended a regional conference  
Have never attended a UKIP 
conference 
 
Hold Office in Party Do you at present hold any 
offices in UKIP? (e.g., 
Branch chairman, treasurer, 
secretary) 
Yes, Branch Chairman  
Yes, Branch Treasurer, Secretary or 
Agent 
Yes, Regional or Local Organizer  
Yes, Other Office - Please Specify  
No  
 
Delivered Literature Have you delivered UKIP 
literature during an 
election? 
Never  
Rarely  
Occasionally 
Frequently 
 
Helped at Meetings Have you helped at party 
functions? 
Never  
Rarely  
Occasionally 
Frequently 
 
Canvassed Have you canvassed voters 
on behalf of UKIP? 
Never  
Rarely  
Occasionally 
Frequently 
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Displayed Poster Have you displayed a UKIP 
poster in a window?  
Never  
Rarely  
Occasionally 
Frequently 
 
Donated Money Have you donated money to 
UKIP?  
Never  
Rarely  
Occasionally 
Frequently 
 
Hours Active between 
Elections 
On average, how many 
hours a week do you devote 
to UKIP activities when 
there is not an election 
going on? 
None  
1-4  
5-8  
9-12  
13-16  
17 or more 
 
Stood for Office Please indicate if you have 
done any of the following 
(tick all that apply) 
Stood for office in UKIP (e.g., for 
the NEC)  
Stood as a UKIP candidate in a local 
election  
Stood as a UKIP candidate in an 
election for the European Parliament  
Stood as a UKIP candidate in a 
general election  
None of the above 
 
Hours Active during 
Elections 
If you were a member of 
UKIP at the time of the 
European Parliament 
elections in 2014, how 
many hours a week did you 
devote to UKIP activities 
during the EU election 
campaign? 
None  
1-4  
5-8  
9-12  
13-16  
17 or more 
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A.2 The General Incentives Model 
Concept Question wording Answers 
Weighted Collective 
Benefits  
Using the 0 to 10 scale, where 10 
means strongly like, and 0 means 
strongly dislike, how do you feel 
about the following political parties: 
- Conservatives 
- Labour 
- Liberal Democrats 
- UKIP 
 
Thinking about yourself, on a scale 
from 0 to 10, how much influence do 
you have on politics and public 
affairs? 
 
From ’Strongly dislike’ (0) 
to ’Strongly like’ (10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From ’No influence’ (0) to 
’Great deal of influence’ 
(10) 
 
 
Perceptions of Costs Here are some statements about 
political activity in Britain. Please 
indicate if you agree or disagree with 
each of them: 
- Attending party meetings can 
be tiring 
- Party activity takes a lot of 
time away from one's family 
- It takes too much time and 
effort to be really active in 
politics and public affairs 
 
 
 
Civic Duty Here are some statements about 
political activity in Britain. Please 
indicate if you agree or disagree with 
each of them: 
- Every citizen should get 
involved in politics if 
democracy is work properly 
- I would be seriously 
neglecting my duty as a 
citizen if I didn't vote 
- If someone is dissatisfied 
with government policies, he 
or she has a duty to get active 
in politics 
- If UKIP is going to be 
successful, every party 
member must contribute as 
much as they can. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
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Political Ambitions Here are some statements about 
political activity in Britain. Please 
indicate if you agree or disagree with 
each of them: 
- A person like me could do a 
good job of being a local 
UKIP councillor 
- I would like to run for 
parliament some day. 
 
How interested are you in having a 
career in politics?  
 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Very interested 
Somewhat interested 
Not very interested 
Not at all interested  
Social Norms Here are some statements about 
political activity in Britain. Please 
indicate if you agree or disagree with 
each of them: 
- Most of my family and 
friends think that working for 
a party is a waste of time 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
 
Ideology In politics, people sometimes talk 
about 'left' and 'right' when 
describing parties, leaders, or 
political ideas. Using the scale 
below, where would you put 
yourself? 
From “Left” (0) to “Right” 
(10) 
Social Network 
Motivation 
Here are some statements about 
political activity in Britain. Please 
indicate if you agree or disagree with 
each of them: 
- Being an active party 
member is a good way to 
meet interesting people 
- Getting involved in party 
activities can be fun 
- Being a party member is a 
good way to learn about 
politics 
- Being a UKIP party member 
can help people like me in 
their business careers 
- If UKIP members work 
together they can really 
change Britain 
 
 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
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A.3 The Mobilisation Model 
Concept Question wording Answers 
Evaluations of Farage Using the 0-10 scale, where 10 
means strongly like and 0 means 
strongly dislike, how do you feel 
about Nigel Farage 
From “Strongly dislike” (0) 
to “Strongly like” (10) 
Social Network 
Recruitment 
Thinking back to when you joined 
UKIP, how did you join? 
I joined after a friend or 
family member introduced 
me to the party 
I joined some other way 
Attention to Politics On a scale from 0 to 10, how much 
attention do you pay to politics and 
public affairs? 
From ”Pay no attention to 
politics” (0) to “Pay great 
deal of attention” (10) 
Parents Politically 
Active 
Were either your father or mother 
actively involved in politics? (please 
tick all that apply) 
Father was active 
Mother was active 
Neither parent was active in 
politics 
 
Past Party 
Membership 
Before becoming a member of 
UKIP, were you ever a member of 
another party or parties? 
No 
Yes 
Social Network 
Motivation 
Here are some statements about 
political activity in Britain. Please 
indicate if you agree or disagree with 
each of them: 
- Being an active party 
member is a good way to 
meet interesting people 
- Getting involved in party 
activities can be fun 
- Being a party member is a 
good way to learn about 
politics 
- Being a UKIP party member 
can help people like me in 
their business careers 
- If UKIP members work 
together they can really 
change Britain 
 
 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
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A.4 The Micro Relative Deprivation Model 
Concept Question wording Answers 
Left Behind  Perceptions of household financial 
situation minus perceptions of 
national economic performance over 
the last 12 months 
 
Micro Relative 
Deprivation 
Please indicate if you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements: 
- There is often a big gap 
between what people like 
yourself expect out of life and 
what you actually get. 
- The Government generally 
treats people like yourself 
fairly. 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither Agree nor Disagree  
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
 
 
A.5 The Revised Relative Deprivation Model 
Concept Question wording Answers 
Democratic 
Dissatisfaction 
Thinking about how well democracy 
works in this country, on the whole, 
are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very 
dissatisfied with the way that 
democracy works in this country? 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
A little dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Anti-Elitist 
Perceptions  
Please indicate if you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements: 
- Economic inequality is a 
major problem in Britain 
- Social injustice is a major 
problem in Britain 
- Corporate greed is a major 
problem in Britain 
- British banks are making 
excessive profits at the 
expense of ordinary people 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
Economic 
Evaluations 
How do you think the financial 
situation of your household will 
change over the next 12 months?  
 
 
 
How do you think the general 
economic situation in this country 
has changed over the last 12 months? 
 
  
 
Get a lot better 
Get a little better 
Stay the same 
Get a little worse 
Get a lot worse 
 
Got a lot better  
Got a little better 
Stay the same 
Got a little worse 
Got a lot worse 
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How do you think the general 
economic situation in this country 
will develop over the next 12 
months?  
 
 
 How does the financial situation of 
your household now compare with 
what it was 12 months ago? Has it: 
 
Get a lot better  
Get a little better 
Stay the same 
Get a little worse 
Get a lot worse 
 
Got a lot better 
Got a little better 
Stay the same 
Got a little worse 
Got a lot worse 
Dissatisfaction with 
the EU 
Overall, do you strongly approve, 
approve, disapprove, or strongly 
disapprove of Britain's membership 
in the European Union? 
Strongly approve 
Approve 
Disapprove 
Strongly disapprove 
Dissatisfaction with 
Immigration 
Respondents who think immigration 
is the most important issue facing the 
country. 
 
Do you think the number of 
immigrants coming to Britain these 
days is: 
 
 
 
Which of the following statements 
comes closest to your view? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How well do you think the present 
government has handled the number 
of immigrants coming to Britain? 
 
 
 
Respondents who say that 
immigration into Britain makes them 
feel angry, disgusted or uneasy.  
 
Using the 0-10 scale, how important 
a problem is the number of 
 
 
 
 
A lot better 
A little better 
The same 
A little worse 
A lot worse 
 
Britain should increase the 
number of immigrants 
coming to the country 
The current number of 
immigrants coming to 
Britain is about right. 
Britain should reduce the 
number of immigrants 
coming to the country 
Britain should stop all 
immigration to the country  
 
 
Very well 
Fairly well 
Neither well nor badly 
Fairly badly 
Very badly 
 
 
 
 
 
From “Not at all important” 
(0) to “Very important” (10) 
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immigrants coming to Britain these 
days? 
 
A.6 Demographics 
Concept Question wording Answers 
Age What is your age group?  25 or younger 
26-35 
36-45 
46-55 
56-65 
66 or older 
 
Male What is your gender? Man 
Woman 
 
Education What is your highest 
educational qualification? 
No formal qualifications  
Youth training 
certificate/skillseekers 
Recognised trade apprenticeship 
completed 
Clerical and commercial 
City and Guild certificate 
City and Guild certificate - advanced 
ONC  
CSE grades 2-5 
CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, 
School Certificate 
Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate 
GCE A level or Higher Certificate 
Scottish Higher Certificate 
Nursing qualification (eg SEN, SRN, 
SCM, RGN)  
Teaching qualification (not degree)  
University diploma 
University or CNAA first degree (eg 
BA, B.Sc, B.Ed) 
University or CNAA higher degree 
(eg M.Sc, Ph.D) 
Other technical, professional or 
higher qualification 
   
Income What is your annual 
household income? 
Less than £19,999 
£20,000 to £29,999 
£30,000 to £39,999 
£40,000 to £49,999 
£50,000 to £69,999 
£70,000 to £99,999 
£100,000 to £149,999 
£150,000 or more 
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Summary statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max 
Activism Scale 12,114 -0.00 1.81 -1.93 -1.42 -0.70 1.06 5.34 
Political Support 12,114 -0.00 0.43 -0.65 -0.36 -0.09 0.28 1.08 
Political Activism 12,114 -0.00 0.70 -0.69 -0.60 -0.27 0.53 1.47 
High Intensity Activism 12,114 0.00 0.77 -0.59 -0.55 -0.34 0.29 2.79 
Male 12,114 0.84 0.37 0 1 1 1 1 
Age 12,114 4.88 1.33 1 4 5 6 6 
Income 12,114 3.14 1.78 1 2 3 4 8 
Education 12,114 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
Economic Evaluations 12,114 -0.001 1.00 -2.34 -0.75 0.05 0.77 3.28 
Left Behind 12,114 -0.01 1.84 -7 -1 0 1 8 
Democracy Dissatisfaction 12,114 3.28 0.82 1 3 3 4 4 
Dissatisfaction with the EU 12,114 3.86 0.41 1 4 4 4 5 
Dissatisfaction with Immigration 12,114 0.02 0.97 -7.83 -0.13 0.39 0.58 1.25 
Micro Relative Deprivation 12,114 7.26 1.64 2 6 7 8 10 
Anti-Elitist Perceptions 12,114 0.01 1.00 -3.30 -0.67 0.14 0.74 1.29 
Social Network Recruitment 12,114 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1 
Attention to Politics 12,114 8.57 1.56 0 8 9 10 10 
Social Network Motivations 12,114 -0.03 0.99 -5.65 -0.61 0.005 0.58 3.98 
Parents Politically Active 12,114 0.39 0.87 0 0 0 0 4 
Party Member in Past 12,114 0.31 0.46 0 0 0 1 1 
Weighted Collective Benefits 12,114 137.44 178.33 0 0 75 198 1,000 
Perception of Costs 12,114 0.01 1.01 -3.65 -0.62 0.02 0.71 3.57 
Civic Duty 12,114 0.003 0.99 -5.32 -0.52 0.15 0.69 2.81 
Political Ambitions 12,114 0.06 0.98 -2.08 -0.75 -0.04 0.84 2.57 
Social Norms 12,114 3.05 0.92 1 2 3 4 5 
Left-Right Ideology 12,114 7.18 1.82 0 6 7 8 10 
Evaluations of Farage 12,114 -7.61 2.20 -10.00 -9.33 -8.00 -6.67 10.00 
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Table B.1: Rival Models of the Combined Party Activism Scale in UKIP, Context Controls 
 
Micro Relative 
Deprivation 
Revised Relative 
Deprivation Mobilization 
General 
Incentives 
Age -0.07*** (0.01) -0.09*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) 0.16*** (0.01) 
Male -0.09** (0.04) -0.04 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) -0.07** (0.04) 
Education 0.08*** (0.03) 0.10*** (0.03) 0.10*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 
Income -0.08*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) 
Left Behind 0.09*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 
Micro Relative 
Deprivation 0.08
***
 (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 
  
Democracy 
Dissatisfaction  -0.01 (0.02)   
Anti-Elitist Perceptions 0.05*** (0.02) 
Economic Evaluations -0.14*** (0.02) 
Dissatisfaction with the 
EU  0.24
***
 (0.04) 
  
Dissatisfaction with 
Immigration  0.07
***
 (0.02) 
  
Social Network 
Recruitment   0.83
***
 (0.06) 
 
Attention to Politics 0.18*** (0.01) 
Parents Politically 
Active   0.04
**
 (0.02) 
 
Party Member in Past 0.23*** (0.03) 
Evaluations of Farage 0.05*** (0.01) 
Evaluations of Farage 
Squared   0.01
***
 (0.001) 
 
Weighted Collective 
Benefits    
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
Perception of Costs -0.23*** (0.01) 
Civic Duty 0.07*** (0.01) 
Political Ambitions 0.63*** (0.02) 
Social Norms 0.05*** (0.02) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.14*** (0.04) 
Ideology Squared -0.02*** (0.003) 
Social Network 
Motivations   0.40
***
 (0.02) 0.38*** (0.01) 
Member: 2013-2014 0.71*** (0.05) 0.68*** (0.05) 0.67*** (0.05) 0.67*** (0.04) 
Member: 2010-2013 1.05*** (0.04) 1.02*** (0.04) 0.99*** (0.04) 1.03*** (0.04) 
Member: 2005-2010 1.45*** (0.06) 1.42*** (0.06) 1.35*** (0.06) 1.43*** (0.05) 
Member: 2001-2004 1.72*** (0.07) 1.69*** (0.07) 1.62*** (0.07) 1.70*** (0.06) 
Member: Before 2001 2.01*** (0.08) 1.98*** (0.08) 1.87*** (0.07) 2.00*** (0.07) 
Constant -0.87*** (0.12) -1.34*** (0.19) -2.14*** (0.12) -2.11*** (0.15) 
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AIC 47348.23 47200.39 46075.29 43185.36 
Observations 12,114 12,114 12,114 12,114 
R2 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.37 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The baseline 
category for membership is since the European Parliament elections in May 2014. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B.2: Composite Models of the Latent Activism Measures, Context Controls 
 
Overall 
Activism Political Support 
Political 
Activism 
High Intensity 
Activism 
Age 0.14*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.003) 0.06*** (0.005) 0.04*** (0.01) 
Male 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 
Education 0.06** (0.03) -0.01 (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 
Income -0.05*** (0.01) -0.01*** (0.002) -0.02*** (0.003) -0.02*** (0.004) 
Left Behind 0.03*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.002) 0.01*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.003) 
Micro Relative Deprivation -0.03*** (0.01) -0.01*** (0.002) -0.02*** (0.004) -0.01*** (0.004) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction 0.002 (0.02) -0.01 (0.004) 0.01 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) 
Anti-Elitist Perceptions -0.05*** (0.02) -0.01* (0.004) -0.02*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) 
Economic Evaluations -0.11*** (0.02) -0.02*** (0.004) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) 
Dissatisfaction with the EU 0.16*** (0.03) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Dissatisfaction with 
Immigration 0.03
*
 (0.01) 0.01** (0.003) 0.004 (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 
Social Network Recruitment 0.73*** (0.05) 0.16*** (0.01) 0.31*** (0.02) 0.26*** (0.02) 
Attention to Politics 0.05*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.002) 0.02*** (0.004) 0.02*** (0.004) 
Parents Politically Active 0.003 (0.02) 0.002 (0.004) -0.004 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 
Party Member in Past 0.11*** (0.03) 0.02** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 
Evaluations of Farage 0.02 (0.01) 0.002 (0.003) 0.01* (0.005) 0.01* (0.01) 
Evaluations of Farage 
Squared 0.001 (0.001) 0.0004
*
 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.0004 (0.0004) 
Weighted Collective 
Benefits 
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
0.001*** 
(0.0000) 0.001
***
 (0.0000) 
Perception of Costs -0.22*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.003) -0.10*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) 
Civic Duty 0.07*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.003) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 
Political Ambitions 0.61*** (0.02) 0.12*** (0.004) 0.23*** (0.01) 0.26*** (0.01) 
Social Norms 0.04*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.004) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.15*** (0.04) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.02) 
Ideology Squared -0.02*** (0.003) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) 
Social Network Motivations 0.38*** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.003) 0.14*** (0.01) 0.15*** (0.01) 
Member: 2013-2014 0.64*** (0.04) 0.18*** (0.01) 0.24*** (0.02) 0.22*** (0.02) 
Member: 2010-2013 0.98*** (0.04) 0.28*** (0.01) 0.35*** (0.01) 0.35*** (0.02) 
Member: 2005-2010 1.35*** (0.05) 0.40*** (0.01) 0.48*** (0.02) 0.47*** (0.02) 
Member: 2001-2004 1.61*** (0.06) 0.46*** (0.01) 0.60*** (0.02) 0.55*** (0.03) 
Member: Before 2001 1.85*** (0.07) 0.53*** (0.02) 0.68*** (0.03) 0.64*** (0.03) 
Constant -2.78*** (0.22) -0.76*** (0.05) -0.99*** (0.09) -1.03*** (0.10) 
AIC 42828.82 8365.19 20507.46 22840.15 
Observations 12,114 12,114 12,114 12,114 
R2 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.36 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The baseline 
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category for membership is since the European Parliament elections in May 2014. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
  
